(1) ‘It was an off-hand compliment during a January 2007 dinner meeting between Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, plus staff, and then-U.S. Central Commander boss General John Abizaid. But Al Nayhan’s jocular praise, as reported in WikiLeaks’ trove of leaked diplomatic cables, is a rare admission that the United States played a central role in the disastrous December 2006 Ethiopian Woyanne [the ruling party in Ethiopia] invasion of Somalia, a move that ultimately emboldened the very Islamic extremists the U.S. and Ethiopia Woyanne had hoped to squash.’
Full story at Ethiopian Review.
(2) ‘Frazer spread rumors of a possible jihadist takeover in Somalia that would threaten Ethiopian security. Turns out that media performance was little more than a smokescreen. The U.S. military had been preparing Ethiopia for the invasion, providing military aid and training Ethiopian troops. Then on December 4, 2006, CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid was in Addis Ababa on what was described as “a courtesy call.” Instead, the plans for the invasion were finalized.’
Full article at Foreign Policy in Focus.
(3) ‘A WikiLeaks’ leaked diplomatic cables exposed Ethiopia and the US government secret agreement to invade Somalia. However, the report indicated that Ethiopia had no intention to the invasion and said the US was behind the plot and was sponsored by the United States government.’ Full article in the Sudan Tribune. I am finding it hard to find the exact cable that reveals ‘U.S. head for African affairs Jendayi Frazer was… the spearhead of the proxy war along[side] allies in the State Department and the Pentagon’ because of the unscientific, unverifiable way traditional journalists write, i.e. they refer to a cable without mentioning the embassy of origin or date, and provide no link.
(4) The best I can do is the full text of the January 2007 cable from Abu Dhabi:
VZCZCXRO3512
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0145/01 0311205
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311205Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8138
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0280
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1559
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0349
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000145
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM IZ IR AF AE
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID TALKS IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN WITH
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE
Classified By: Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (S) Summary. On the evening of January 21, Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed
Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid for dinner. They
discussed regional security issues, but Iraq was clearly the
focus of MbZ’s interest. MbZ expressed lack of confidence in
being able to work with the Maliki government. MbZ believes
that the Saudis will not support any Sunni group in Iraq with
Al-Qaeda ties, but that the Saudis are firm in their resolve
to counter Iran. MbZ reiterated UAE interest in acquiring
Predator B. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: “The Somalia job was fantastic.” Also present
were UAE Chief of Staff, Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani
Al-Rumaithy; Director of Intelligence, Staff Brigadier
General Engineer Essa Saif Mohammed Al-Mazrouei; Commander of
the Special Operations, Major General Juma Ahmed Al-Bawardi
Al-Falasi; and Commander of the UAE Air Forces and Air
Defense, Staff Air Vice-Marshal (Major General) Mohammed
Sowaidan Al-Gimzy. End Summary.
Iraq
—-
¶2. (C) Clearly the focus for MbZ, discussion began with his
pronouncement: “Let’s talk about Iraq.” Gen. Abizaid noted
that extremists on both ends of the Sunni/Shia spectrum are
largely irretrievable, but we still have an opportunity to
stabilize Iraq by reinforcing the moderate middle ground.
MbZ said that he had little confidence in being able to work
with this (Maliki’s) government, saying of Maliki: “I think
we are operating on different frequencies — no, different
radio systems altogether.”
¶3. (S) MbZ asked General Abizaid what the U.S. hoped to
achieve with the extra troops set to deploy to Iraq in 2007,
and reiterated his concern about the level of ongoing
violence against the Sunni. Abizaid responded that the
violence in Iraq is highly localized, principally in the
Baghdad area, and that most of the rest of Iraq is quiet. The
extra troops are intended to bring calm to Baghdad and give
the government sufficient space and time to contain violence
even further. It will also send a message that the U.S. is
not abandoning Iraq. MbZ stated that Ahmad Chalabi and
others had made a “big deal” out of the Baathist threat, but
said that the Baathists were not and are not the problem —
even though specific individuals linked to the Ba,ath Party
were/are the problem. MbZ offered that de-Baathification was
and is “an unnecessary distraction,” stating that “pursuing a
problem that doesn’t really exist only leads to more
problems.” He said he had seen Iyad Allawi a month ago —
noting that Allawi was looking to the UAE for support and
assurances. MbZ said that there is no assurance that the UAE
can give him, adding: “It’s not his time.” MbZ added that he
believes that the Saudis will not assist Sunni groups in Iraq
that are aligned with Al-Qaeda.
Iran
—-
¶4. (S) MbZ acknowledged that Tehran knows that the U.S. is
serious in its stance against Iranian proliferation. This
can be clearly seen in “how Iran is changing its tactics.”
Abizaid pressed that countries in the region should make
stronger statements. Weak statements only encourage the
Iranians: “We need our friends to say that they stand with
the Americans.” MbZ avoided committing the UAE to anything
like a public statement and shifted the discussion to other
countries in the region saying: “The Saudis need no
encouragement — they are Wahhabis after all — and will
resolutely stand up to any Shi’a anywhere and counter them
strongly.” Agreeing that it is only a matter of time before
the Iranians develop or acquire advanced weapons
technologies, including MTCR-controlled UAV technology, MbZ
asserted: “That’s why we need it first . . . give me
Predator B.” MbZ added: “Iran has to know that there is a
price to pay for every decision they make. They are
expanding day by day — they have to be dealt with before
they do something tragic.” But that said, he continued: “We
(UAE) are not ready yet” to confront Iran.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
——————–
¶5. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the actions of the UAE forces
currently deployed in Afghanistan. MbZ reciprocated: “No —
ABU DHABI 00000145 002 OF 002
thank you. This has been a good chance for us, and we
appreciate the opportunity.” MbZ questioned the role the
Iranians were playing in Afghanistan. He further observed
that Musharraf is not doing enough to engage the tribes in
the south, and needs to expand its efforts there.
Lebanon/Hizballah/Somalia
————————–
¶6. (S) Noting Lebanese PM Siniora’s January 16 visit to the
UAE, MbZ characterized Siniora as &a good man. We are
supporting him.” MbZ said that Hizballah has made a “big
mistake” in estimating its support in Lebanon, and has
“played it wrong — they do not have the support of the
majority of the Lebanese people.” MbZ discussed with Abizaid
the military technology that Hizballah used in 2006,
specifically noting the amount of anti-tank weapons that
Hizballah possessed. Abizaid acknowledged that Hizballah has
access to weapons technology that most Arab states don’t
have. MbZ interrupted the conversation to state explicitly
that he wants the U.S. to understand that the UAE was not
involved in the transfer of those weapons or technologies in
any way. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: “The Somalia job was fantastic.”
¶7. (U) POLAD Ambassador Richard Roth has approved this
message.
SISON
